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STATE OF UTAH 
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VERL STONE, Utah County Commis-
sioner, MACK HOLLEY, Utah County 
Sheriff, and UTAH COUNTY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
13715 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 4th Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED H. BUHLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
VERL STONE, Utah County Commis-
sioner, MACK HOLLEY, Utah County 
Sheriff, and UTAH COUNTY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, appellant respectfully petitions this Honorable 
Court for a rehearing and as grounds therefor shows the 
following points of error. 
POINTS OF ERROR 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
CaseNo. 
13715 
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ING TO FIND UTAH COUNTY ORDIN-
ANCE 1970-1 SO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN 
AS TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
It is a central tenet of constitutional law that "a 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague, that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential of due process of 
law." Connolly v. General Construction Company, 269 
U. S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127 (1926). In that case, 
the Supreme Court of United States sought to detemiine 
whether a criminal statute was sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their 
part will render them liable to its penalties. At issue in 
the instant case is an ordinance adopted by Utah County 
which requires those owning real property in unincor-
porated areas to remove, "any unsightly or deleterious 
objects." Such language is so vague and uncertain that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning. 
Plaintiff realizes vagueness is a matter of degree and 
* context. "There are limitations in the English language 
with respect to being both specific and manageably brief," 
United States Civil Service Commission v. National As-
sociation of Letter Carriers, AFL, CIO, 13 U. S. 548, 578, 
93 S. Ct. 2880, 2897 (1973) and that, "condemned to the 
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty 
from our language." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U. S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (1972). Moreover, 
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plaintiff recognizes there are, "areas of human conduct 
where by the nature of the problems presented, legisla-
tures simply cannot establish standards with great pre-
cision/' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 581, 91 S. Ct. 
1242, 1251 (1974). 
In determining whether the Utah County ordinance 
which requires removal of "any unsightly or deleterious 
objects" is too vague and uncertain it is necessary to 
examine whether the ordinance creates a standard of 
conduct which is capable of objective interpretation by 
those residents such as Buhler who must abide by it and 
those Utah County officials who must enforce it, and 
also by any judicial tribunal such as this Court which 
might review the removal and destruction of "unsightly 
property." On its face, the Utah County ordinance re-
quires removal of "unsightly or deleterious objects" ten 
days after due notice. It is obvious that the use of such 
descriptive terms as unsightly and deleterious are illusory 
for these terms have no inherent, objective content from 
which ascertainable standards could possibly be fashioned. 
Even if one views these as did the Court in the light of 
context and purpose of the county ordinance; (which is 
ostensibly health and sanitation) there would still exist 
no meaningful standard. Plaintiff is at a loss to under-
stand how the overall purpose of the ordinance can rec-
tify the inherent vagueness of such subjective terms as 
"unsightly" or "deleterious." The total context of the 
ordinance is insufficient to eradicate the inherent sub-
jectivity of such words as "unsightly" and "deleterious." 
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l ike beauty, the content of unsightly exists only in 
the eye of the beholder. The subjectivity implied in the 
language of this Utah County ordinance permits county 
officials to enforce the ordinance with unfettered discre-
tion and it is precisely this potential for arbitrary en-
forcement which is abhorrent to the Due Process Clause. 
Furthermore, because the ordinance contains no ascer-
tainable standards for enforcement, judicial review can 
only be a meaningless gesture. There is simply no bench 
mark against which the validity of the application of this 
rule calling for the removal of "unsightly" objects can be 
tested. The Utah County ordinance taken within-con-
text or taken out-of-context erf any ostensible purpose of 
the ordinance still conforms to the classic definition of 
vagueness as stated by this Court itself in State v. Pack-
ard, 250 P. 2d 561 (1953) because the terms of this 
ordinance are so vague as to leave the individual to guess 
at its meaning. 
The root of this vagueness doctrine is simply a rough 
idea of fairness. The Utah County ordinance is not fair 
to Buhler. It is not fair because in the final analysis, each 
individual has his own idea of what is "unsightly" and 
such ideas are as numerous as the opinions of man. The 
law requires that crimes be defined with more certainty 
than that. State v. Musser, 223 P. 2d 193 (1950). 
POINT II. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FIND-
ING THAT UTAH COUNTY ORDINANCE 
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1970-1 AFFORDED BUHLER AN OPPOR-
TUNITY FOR A HEARING. 
Buhler collected old automobiles and has acquired 
261 old vehicles which he stores on his farm. An auto-
mobile dealer, of long standing in Utah County, testified 
that the automobiles had a value of $28,000, thus, the 
plaintiff was faced with a significant property interest 
which would be lost if the County removed and destroyed 
these vehicles. 
The ordinance, requiring removal of Buhler's cars 
if they were "unsightly" made no provision for the hold-
ing of any kind of hearing to determine whether there 
was a valid basis for the removal of these so-called "un-
sightly" objects. Buhler had the dubious choice of test-
ing the constitutionality of the ordinance or relinquishing 
all his property rights. The ordinance granted plaintiff 
no hearing; therefore, it was necessary for him to test its 
constitutionality. 
Procedural due process of law requires that before 
valuable property rights, such as Buhler's, can be directly 
infringed upon by governmental action, that there must 
be notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Trust Company, 339 U. S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 
652 (1950); Fuentas v. Shewn, 407 U. S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 
1983 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586 
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 
(1970); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 
780 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 
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S. Ct. 2701 (1972). The failure of Utah County ordinance 
1970-1 to provide any opportunity for a meaningful hear-
ing prior to deprivation of property is in contravention 
of the minimum standards of procedural due process. 
The opinion of the majority of the Court is that 
Buhler, by his bringing a suit, by having his trial and 
by the subsequent review of the Court was, therefore, 
given sufficient opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff re-
spectfully submits that judicial review, being open as a 
last resort to him, was an insufficient remedy to the lack 
of procedural due process in the ordinance because there 
existed no provision for a hearing. An eventual attempt 
to vindicate one's property rights through judicial pro-
cess will not substitute for the lack of any provision in 
the Utah County ordinance for a meaningful hearing. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S INTERESTS WERE AD-
VERSELY AFFECTED BY THE ORDIN-
ANCE AND HIS CHALLENGE OF ITS CON-
STITUTIONALITY IS NOT SIMPLY AN 
ABSTRACT EXERCISE. 
The majority opinion of the Court says Buhler at-
tacks the ordinance as, "an abstract proposition/' and 
may not do so, "because it may unjustly effect someone 
else." The removal and destruction by the County of 
Buhler's automobiles was an imminent possibility. This 
case does involve mere abstractions in which Buhler seeks 
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to vindicate the constitutional rights of others. Rather, 
Buhler was confronted with a real and imminent threat 
of destruction of his property. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits the Supreme Court 
erred in failing to find the Utah County ordinance 1970-1 
so vague and unceortain that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning. The Court also 
erred in finding the ordinance gave Buhler an opportun-
ity for a hearing. Appellant respectfully submits that 
the majority opinion should be reconsidered and reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON R. PETERSEN 
HOWARD, LEWIS 
& PETERSEN 
120 East Third North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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